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I.  Introduction: Farmworker Families and Pesticides 
Farmworker families are the largely invisible victims of modern American agriculture’s 
dependence on pesticides.  Millions of farmworkers, including children, labor daily in fields and 
greenhouses, tending and harvesting crops.  Multiple avenues of exposure to pesticides affect 
both farmworkers and their families – particularly children – and socioeconomic factors often 
exacerbate the health and safety risks from these exposures.  As a result, farmworker pesticide 
exposure implicates concerns about both child health and environmental justice.  Prior executive 
and legislative actions have sought to address these issues by directing responsible agencies to 
consider disproportionate impacts on children and underrepresented populations.  Unfortunately, 
in the realm of pesticides, these directives have gone largely unheeded. 
  While the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates pesticide residues on foods to 
protect the American consumer, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates pesticide 
approvals and establishes safe overall pesticide exposure levels under the authority of the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).  In the past, EPA has taken some steps to 
ensure that farmworkers and children are protected from overexposure.  However, these past 
regulatory efforts have failed to consider some important sources of pesticide exposure and have 
not considered the disproportionate effects of pesticides on farmworker families.  Recently, 
under the Obama administration, the EPA has taken steps to close these loopholes, but more 
action is needed. 
  This paper provides a comprehensive introduction to the problem of farmworker 
pesticide exposures and discusses past approaches and their failings.  Part II describes the risks facing farmworker families and the particular issues of environmental justice and child safety 
implicated therein.  Part III briefly describes the statutory and regulatory framework governing 
EPA’s pesticide approval and review process, and EPA’s existing obligations to protect children 
and underrepresented groups.  Part IV identifies EPA’s approaches to farmworker and child 
safety under past administrations, and explains how these measures fall short of adequately 
protecting farmworker families. 
II.  The Problem: Multiple Routes of Exposure, and Limited Means to Respond 
  Pesticides
1 are an inescapable part of life for farmworkers and agricultural communities.  
Both farmworkers and their families are exposed to pesticides through multiple avenues, yielding 
cumulative exposures often far in excess of those facing the average American consumer.  Yet 
socioeconomic, cultural, and political realities often bar the most at-risk individuals from 
obtaining adequate protection against exposure, receiving sufficient medical treatment when 
exposure does occur, or attracting the attention to their plight necessary to prompt significant 
legal changes. 
a.  Pesticide Prevalence and Risks 
Pesticides are a pervasive part of modern American agriculture.  In 2001, over 1.2 billion 
pounds of pesticides were applied in the U.S., comprising nearly a quarter of the world market.
2  
Agriculture accounts for three-quarters of pesticide usage in the U.S.
3  Of the more than $11 
                                                 
1 For purposes of this paper, “pesticide” is defined largely as it is in FIFRA: “any substance or mixture of substances 
intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest,” or “intended for use as a plant regulator, 
defoliant, or dessicant.”  7 U.S.C. § 136(u).  The term encompasses not only insecticides but also herbicides, 
fungicides, rodenticides, and fumigants. 
2 TIMOTHY KIELY, DAVID DONALDSON & ARTHUR GRUBE, EPA, PESTICIDE INDUSTRY SALES AND USAGE: 2000 AND 
2001 MARKET ESTIMATES 8 tbl.3.1 (2004).  
3 See id. at 12 tbl.3.4 (675 million pounds (76%) of “conventional” pesticides); id. at 18 tbl.3.11 (232 million pounds 
(74%) of “other” pesticides).  “Conventional” pesticides include, inter alia, herbicides, plant growth regulators, 
insecticides, miticides, fungicides, nematicides, and fumigants.  See id. at 12.  “Other” pesticides include sulfur, 
petroleum oil, sulfuric acid, insect repellants, and moth control products.  See id. at 18. billion spent on pesticides in 2000 and 2001, the vast majority (68%) were purchased for use in 
the agricultural industry,
4 constituting nearly 4% of total farm expenditures.
5  Two-thirds of U.S. 
farms with harvested cropland use pesticides of one kind or another.
6  Despite increasing 
information on health risks and growing public concern, pesticide use in the agricultural sector 
remained fairly constant over the last two decades of the twentieth century.
7 
  Farmworkers labor on the front lines of American agriculture and are exposed to these 
pesticides in numerous ways.  Some farmworkers are directly employed as “pesticide handlers,” 
mixing, loading, or applying pesticides, cleaning and repairing pesticide equipment, or otherwise 
directly contacting pesticides.
8  The vast majority of farmworkers serve as “agricultural 
workers,” “involved in the production of agricultural plants” by assisting in cultivation or 
harvesting activities at a farm, greenhouse, nursery or forest.
9  While EPA regulates working 
conditions for pesticide handlers more stringently,
10 handlers still face risks from pesticide spills 
and splashes, as well as defective or missing protective equipment.
11 
Both handlers and agricultural workers may be exposed to pesticides along numerous 
routes.  They may be exposed to direct spray in their working area, or they may contact residues 
on plants or on soil.
12  They may be exposed through pesticide drift, in which airborne pesticide 
particles or pesticide-contaminated dust float away from the application site, often following 
                                                 
4 Id. at 6 tbl.2.3. 
5 Id. at 7 tbl.2.4. 
6 See id. at 20 tbl.4.2. 
7 See id. at 28 fig.5.6  
8 See EPA, WPS QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE (2005), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/quickreferenceguide.pdf. 
9 Id.; see also EPA, Worker Protection Standard for Agricultural Pesticides, 
http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/twor.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2010). 
10 See id. (describing more stringent requirements for employers of handlers versus employers of agricultural 
workers); infra Part IV.a. 
11 Farmworker Justice, Farmworkers and Pesticides, http://www.fwjustice.org/Health&Safety/Pesticides.htm (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2010). 
12 Id.  Both of these types of exposures are nominally prevented by the EPA’s protective standards, see infra Part 
IV.a, but in actuality these continue to be common routes for pesticide poisonings.   aerial applications.
13  And they may be exposed through volatilization, in which solid or liquid 
pesticide residues remaining on crops or soil after spraying change to a vapor or gas and become 
airborne.
14  And underreporting of pesticide exposures and injuries is likely a significant problem 
due to the many disadvantages confronting farmworkers, as discussed below.
15 
b.  Farmworker Demographics and Disadvantages 
While exact numbers are hard to come by, reliable estimates suggest there are about 2.5 
million farmworkers in the U.S., 1.8 million of whom are crop workers.
16  Demographics within 
this group are well documented by the U.S. Department of Labor (DoL)’s annual survey of 
agricultural workers.
17 The vast majority (78%) of farmworkers are foreign-born, nearly all 
(75%) from Mexico.
18  Farmworkers are predominantly male and young, and approximately half 
                                                 
13 See EPA, Pesticide Spray and Dust Drift, http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/factsheets/spraydrift.htm (last visited 
May 8, 2010. 
14 See EPA, Pesticide Issues in the Works: Pesticide Volatilization, 
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/about/intheworks/volatilization.htm (last visited May 8, 2010).  
15 See, e.g., Alice Larson, Environmental/Occupational Safety and Health, in MIGRANT HEALTH ISSUES 8, 11 (Nat’l 
Ctr. for Farmworker Health, Inc., 2001), available at http://www.ncfh.org/?pid=22 (“Even in states with mandatory 
reporting of suspected pesticide-related illness, there is a sense that not all incidents are recognized and reported.”) 
16 U.S. GEN’L ACC’TING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-40, PESTICIDES: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO ENSURE THE SAFETY 
OF FARMWORKERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 6 (2000) [hereinafter GAO, PESTICIDES].  While the GAO’s report is 
somewhat out of date, national-level estimates are extremely difficult to generate.  See E-mail from Alice C. Larson, 
Ph.D., to author (Apr. 9, 2010, 5:25 PM) (on file with author) (describing difficulties in defining and quantifying 
farmworkers); Nat’l Ctr. for Farmworker Health, Inc., Enumeration and Population Estimates, 
http://www.ncfh.org/?pid=23 (last visited May 8, 2010) (explaining the challenges of generating an accurate number 
of farmworkers in the U.S., and providing population estimates and maps for eleven states).  The cited figure is close 
to the most recent estimate from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, estimating just over 2.6 million hired 
farmworkers.  See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NO. AC-07-A-51, 2007 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, VOL. 1, at 336 tbl.7 
(2009), available at http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Full_Report/index.asp.  However, this figure 
excludes contract workers, see id. at App. B. B-13, and reflects a suspiciously low number of migrant workers — 
just over 47,000, see id. at 336 tbl.7.  Consequently, the total figure may thus be considerably higher, as some 
sources suggest.  See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FINGERS TO THE BONE: UNITED STATES FAILURE TO PROTECT 
CHILD FARMWORKERS 11 & n.7 (2000) [hereinafter FINGERS TO THE BONE], available at 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2000/frmwrkr/ (citing figure of 2.5 million seasonal farmworkers and 1.5 million 
migrant farmworkers for a total of 4 million). 
17 DoL’s most recent published report compiling this annual data is from 2001–2002, and the data herein comes 
from that report.  OFFICE OF PROGRAMMATIC POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, RESEARCH REPORT NO. 9, FINDINGS 
FROM THE NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY (NAWS) 2001–2002 (2005) [hereinafter NAWS REPORT]. 
18 Id. at 3.  Close to half (42%) are migrant laborers, meaning they “travel at least 75 miles during a 12-month period 
to obtain a farm job.”  Id. at 7. are married and have children.
19  The average farmworker has not attended school beyond 
seventh grade,
20 and the overwhelming majority of foreign-born farmworkers speak little or no 
English.
21  More than half (53%) are not authorized to work in this country.
22  Ninety percent 
had only one or two employers in the prior year, and three-quarters expect to continue as 
farmworkers for at least the next five years.
23   
Poverty and a lack of access to health care are also major concerns.  Farmworkers are 
typically paid by the hour at low wages for predominantly seasonal work, severely limiting 
income.
24  Agricultural employers are exempted from many federal protective standards, 
including overtime and minimum wage laws, as well as health and safety standards.
25  Thirty 
percent of farmworker families have incomes below the poverty line, and poverty increases with 
family size.
26  Farmworker housing is often in deplorable condition or simply unavailable, 
leaving farmworkers without laundry or bathing facilities;
27 and housing often is so close to the 
fields that pesticide exposure can occur at home as well.
28  Only 23% of farmworkers report 
                                                 
19 See id. at 9–10 (79% male and 81% under age 45); id. at 12 (58% married and 51% with children). 
20 See id. at 18. 
21 Among foreign-born farmworkers, 54–57% self-reported that they do not speak English at all, and only 3–4% 
reported speaking English “well.”  Id. at 22.  Among farmworkers overall (including U.S.-born workers), 44% do 
not speak English at all, and only 30% reported speaking even “some” English.  See id. at 21. 
22 Id. at 6. 
23 See id. at 23, 29. 
24 See id. at 35 (60% work seasonally), 37 (79% paid hourly), 38 (average pay $7.25 per hour).  Workers paid hourly 
(as opposed to by the piece), employed seasonally, and engaged in pre-harvest tasks (including pesticide application) 
are paid on average less than $7 per hour.  See id. at 39 tbl.5.8. 
25 See U.S. GEN’L ACC’TING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-193, CHILD LABOR IN AGRICULTURE: CHANGES NEEDED TO 
BETTER PROTECT HEALTH & EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES 16 (1998) [hereinafter GAO, CHILD LABOR]. 
26 See id. at 47, 48 fig.6.1. 
27 See, e.g., Christopher Holden, Housing, in MIGRANT HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 15, at 40, 41; Quirina M. 
Vallejos, Sara A. Quandt & Thomas A. Arcury, The Condition of Farmworker Housing in the Eastern United States, 
in LATINO FARMWORKERS IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 37, 49 (Thomas A. Arcury & Sara A. Quandt eds., 
2009) (citing studies). 
28 One nationwide farmworker housing survey found that 26% of housing units “were directly adjacent to pesticide 
treated fields,” and of these, 53% “lacked a working bathtub/shower, a laundry machine, or both.”  Holden, supra 
note 27, at 41. having health insurance,
29 and few farmworker families benefit from federal assistance 
programs.
30  Furthermore, many farmworkers do not own vehicles and cannot easily get to social 
service agencies or health care facilities when ill.
31   
Taken together, this data suggests that most farmworkers face significant disadvantages 
that make their exposure to pesticides a particularly acute problem.  Due to poverty, lack of 
access to services, and concerns about their undocumented status, many farmworkers fail to 
leave work when they feel ill, seek medical care, or report pesticide exposure situations to 
responsible authorities.  Poor working and living conditions may leave farmworkers unable to 
take appropriate protective measures when exposed (such as immediate washing of pesticide-
laden skin and clothes).
32  Farmworkers also may fear retaliation from their employer or the loss 
of job prospects if they complain or report problems with pesticides, training, or working 
conditions or take time off for sick leave.
33  Due to language and educational limitations, 
farmworkers may experience difficulty in understanding pesticide safety measures, gaining 
access to information about pesticides, or appreciating their legal rights.
34  They may be unable 
to communicate concerns about their working conditions or, in cases of pesticide exposure, may 
not be able to describe the circumstances of the exposure or their symptoms to medical staff and 
                                                 
29 Id. at 41–42; see also CALIFORNIANS FOR PESTICIDE REFORM, FIELDS OF POISON 2002, at 10 (2002) [hereinafter 
FIELDS OF POISON] (reporting two-thirds of California farmworkers surveyed had no health insurance and only 
11.5% got health insurance through their employer). 
30 Only 24% of farmworker households receive contribution-based benefits such as unemployment, social security, 
or disability payments, and only 22% receive needs-based benefits such as welfare, food stamps, public housing or 
Medicaid.  See FIELDS OF POISON, supra note 29, at 50–51. 
31 Id. at 10; see also NAWS REPORT, supra note 17, at 45. 
32 See NAWS REPORT, supra note 17, at 45 (noting small but significant percentage of farmworkers (5%) did not 
have access to water for washing at work); sources cited supra notes 27–28. 
33 See Larson, supra note 15, at 11; Patricia G. Schnitzer & Jackilen Shannon, Development of a Surveillance 
Program for Occupational Pesticide Poisoning: Lessons Learned and Future Directions, 114 PUBLIC HEALTH 
REPORTS 242, 243 (1999); FIELDS OF POISON, supra note 29 at 9 (2002) (“The threat that sick leave (even a few 
hours) may lead to reduced pay or job loss is a strong deterrent against taking time off to visit the doctor.”). 
34 See, e.g., Tina Castañares, Outreach Services, in MIGRANT HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 15, at 27, 28. investigating agencies.
35  Furthermore, healthcare providers may be unfamiliar with symptoms of 
pesticide exposure, and may fail to investigate or consider a patient’s work history or residence 
during diagnosis.
36  Given the disadvantages of this minority and low-income group, and the 
significant health hazards they face, farmworker pesticide exposure is clearly an issue of 
environmental justice. 
c.  Special Risks for Farmworker Children 
Farmworker children are exposed to pesticides in several ways.  First, many farmworkers 
are children.
37  Past DoL data found that nearly 130,000 fourteen- to seventeen-year-olds are 
employed in crop production — a likely underestimate
38 — and recent surveys show this age 
group makes up 6% of farmworkers.
39  The DoL survey does not cover children under the age of 
14, even though federal law allows children as young as 10 to work in agricultural jobs.
40  And 
past data suggests that some children of farmworkers do work in the fields alongside their 
parents, although the percentage is small.
41  Second, even children who do not work in the fields 
are sometimes brought there during the day, since both parents are working and day care may be 
                                                 
35 See Larson, supra note 15, at 8, 11. 
36 See id. at 11–12 (discussing problem and some efforts to insure adequate training of healthcare professionals). 
37 See generally ASS’N OF FARMWORKER OPPORTUNITY PROGRAMS, CHILDREN IN THE FIELDS: AN AMERICAN 
PROBLEM (2007) [hereinafter AFOP, CHILDREN IN THE FIELDS] (discussing child farmworkers and proposing legal 
changes). 
38 See GAO, PESTICIDES, supra note 16, at 6; see also GAO, CHILD LABOR, supra note 25, at 23 (explaining likely 
reasons for underestimates).  Some estimates are much higher.  See FINGERS TO THE BONE, supra note 16, at 10 
(citing United Farm Workers estimate of 800,000); AFOP, CHILDREN IN THE FIELDS, supra note 37, at 6 (estimating 
400,000 to 500,000). 
39 NAWS REPORT, supra note 17, at 10 fig.2.2. 
40 See GAO, CHILD LABOR, supra note 25, at 31 tbl.3.1.  In nonagricultural jobs, children cannot work until age 14.  
Additionally, children may be employed in hazardous agricultural jobs — including handling pesticides — at age 
16, while hazardous jobs are entirely prohibited for children outside the agricultural sector.  See id.; Shelly Davis, 
Child Labor, in MIGRANT HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 15, at 51, 54 ( “As a result, a child can apply toxic pesticides 
on a farm at 16, but could not apply the same pesticides on a golf course until age 18.”) 
41 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT ON THE YOUTH LABOR FORCE 54 (2000) [hereinafter DOL, YOUTH LABOR] 
(reporting that, according to mid-1990s NAWS surveys, 6% of farmworker children did farmwork, and “[o]nly 3 
percent of 6- to 13-year-olds and virtually none of the children under 6 were reported by their parents to have 
worked in the fields”).  However, since such employment is illegal underreporting is obviously a major possibility. hard to come by.
42  Third, even children who do not go to the fields may be exposed to pesticides 
in their homes and communities.  Nearly two-thirds of farmworker parents live with all of their 
children under the age of 18.
43  These children can be exposed to pesticide residues that the 
farmworker brings home on clothing, shoes, or skin,
44 and farmworker homes may lack adequate 
bathing facilities to wash off pesticide residues.
45  Many farmworkers and their families live on 
or near the agricultural fields,
46 increasing the risk that pesticides will drift into these residential 
areas.
47  This drift can enter and surround homes, schools, parks, and other areas where children 
are likely to face exposure.
48  Infants may be exposed to pesticides through breastmilk, soil and 
well water in agricultural areas may be contaminated with pesticides, and farm families may 
consume food taken directly from the fields, further increasing the risks of exposure.
49 
Children face greater risks of harm from pesticides than adults, for several reasons.  First, 
children may be disproportionately exposed to pesticides because they behave differently from 
adults.  Children breathe and eat more than adults relative to their body weight, consume 
different foods, put objects in their mouths and have greater hand-to-mouth contact, and spend 
                                                 
42 See id. at 55 (reporting 7% of parents with children under 5 brought them to work sometime in the past year); 
GAO, PESTICIDES, supra note 16, at 6. 
43 NAWS REPORT, supra note 17, at 14. 
44 See Farmworker Justice, Pesticide Advocacy, http://www.fwjustice.org/Health&Safety/Advocacy.htm; Letter 
from EPA Union Leaders to EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson 2 (May 24, 2006), available at 
http://www.nrdc.org/media/docs/060525.pdf. 
45 See FIELDS OF POISON, supra note 29, at 26 (recommending better housing “so farmworkers can follow 
recommendations to bathe after pesticide exposure”). 
46 See NAWS REPORT, supra note 17, at 45 (11% of farmworkers live where they work and 40% within nine miles); 
Christopher Holden, Housing, in MIGRANT HEALTH ISSUES, supra note 15, at 40, 41 (26% of units surveyed 
adjacent to pesticide-treated fields). 
47 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., PESTICIDES IN THE DIET OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN 309 
(1993) [hereinafter NAS REPORT], available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=2126 (noting that 
“[e]xposure to pesticide residues from ambient air sources is generally higher in areas close to agricultural lands”). 
48 See Pesticides in the Air – Kids at Risk: Petition to EPA to Protect Children from Pesticide Drift 9–10 (Oct. 13, 
2009), available at http://www.earthjustice.org/library/legal_docs/petition-pesticides-in-the-air-kids-at-risk.pdf 
[hereinafter Earthjustice Petition] (citing examples of drift incidents in communities and schools); Latino Issues 
Forum & Redefining Progress, Policy Brief, Better Safe than Sorry: Preventing Pesticide Drift in California 3 (Aug. 
2004), available at http://pesticidereform.org/downloads/pesticideDriftBrief.pdf. 
49 See Objection to Tolerances Established for Certain Pesticide Chemicals, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,628, 41,632 (June 19, 
2002) (reprinting text of environmental group petition making these claims). more time in contact with potentially contaminated surfaces like floors and lawns.
50  Second, 
children may be disproportionately impacted by exposure to those pesticides.  Because children’s 
bodies are still developing, “their enzymatic, metabolic, and immune systems may provide less 
natural protection than those of an adult,” and pesticide levels that would be safe for adults can 
damage the growing organs of young children, particularly their brains.
51  Recent medical studies 
have shown evidence of increased childhood cancer and autism rates in communities located 
close to agricultural pesticide applications.
52 
The socioeconomic disadvantages and heightened pesticide risks faced by farmworker 
families lead to substantial concerns about both environmental justice
53 and children’s health.  
EPA states that environmental justice “will be achieved when everyone enjoys the same degree 
of protection from environmental and health hazards and equal access to the decision-making 
process to have a healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work.”
54  Clearly, this promise 
has not been met for farmworkers and their families: they are disproportionately exposed to 
pesticides both at work and at home, and lack protections equivalent to those available to the 
average American.  Admittedly, part of the risk to farmworker communities may be an 
unavoidable consequence of modern American agriculture, and true environmental justice 
                                                 
50 See EPA, Protecting Children from Pesticides, http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/factsheets/kidpesticide.htm; GAO, 
PESTICIDES, supra note 16, at 17; Earthjustice Petition, supra note 48, at 5. 
51 GAO, PESTICIDES, supra note 16, at 17; see also Earthjustice Petition, supra note 48, at 5. 
52 See, e.g., Eric M. Roberts et al., Maternal Residence Near Agricultural Pesticide Applications and Autism 
Spectrum Disorders among Children in the California Central Valley, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1482 (2007) 
(initial study suggesting link between autism spectrum disorders and proximity to organochlorine pesticide 
applications); Rudolph P. Rull et al., Residential Proximity to Agricultural Pesticide Applications and Childhood 
Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia, 109 ENVTL. RESEARCH 891 (2009) (finding link between a childhood cancer and 
moderate exposure to certain pesticides, and citing numerous related studies).  EPA has disputed the validity of these 
and other studies.  See Imidacloprid – Order Denying Objections to Issuance of Tolerance, 69 Fed. Reg. 30,047, 
30,050–54 (May 26, 2004). 
53 EPA defines environmental justice as “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of 
race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of 
environmental laws, regulations, and policies.”  EPA, Environmental Justice, 
http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/ (last visited May 8, 2010). 
54 Id. arguably might require rethinking our entire approach to the practice of agriculture in this 
country.  But less drastic measures could also help alleviate the disparity.  As discussed below, 
EPA has the ability to take action to protect farmworkers from pesticides; EPA’s authority and 
duty to do so are the subject of the next section. 
III.  EPA’s Powers and Duties: The Legal Framework 
a.  Statutory Authority: Pesticide Registration and Tolerance Levels 
EPA has been involved in pesticide regulation since the agency’s inception.  Both the 
administration of FIFRA
55 and the duty to set pesticide tolerances under the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA)
56 were transferred to EPA in 1970;
57 since then, both statutes have 
been extensively amended.  FIFRA has been interpreted to give EPA sole jurisdiction to regulate 
farmworker pesticide exposures.
58  In contrast, EPA and FDA share responsibilities under the 
FFDCA with regards to public health risks from food-borne pesticides.
59  The contours of EPA’s 
duties have changed significantly over time, particularly with the passage of the Food Quality 
Protection Act of 1996 (FQPA).
60  Two aspects of EPA’s authority, in particular, are relevant to 
the problem of farmworker pesticide exposures: pesticide registration and tolerance levels. 
                                                 
55 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2006). 
56 21 U.S.C. § 301–399a (2006). 
57 See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 § 2(4), (8), 84 Stat. 2086, 2088 (1970). 
58 See Organized Migrants in Community Action, Inc. v. Brennan, 520 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The court in 
Organized Migrants found that EPA’s “authority to promulgate rules regulating farmworker exposure to pesticides” 
preempted the Department of Labor from issuing such regulations.  Consequently, farmworkers are not protected 
from pesticides under the Occupational Safety and Health Act.  Id. at 1163.   
59 In the 1970s, EPA and FDA reached agreement on how they agencies would divide responsibility for pesticides.  
See Notice Regarding Matters of Mutual Responsibility, 36 Fed. Reg. 24,234 (Dec. 22, 1971); Amendment, 38 Fed. 
Reg. 24,233 (Sept. 6, 1973); Notice of Agreement, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,078 (June 12, 1975). 
60 Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996).  This paper does not seek to address one of the most significant 
changes wrought by the FQPA, namely the exemption of pesticides from the definition of a “food additive,” thus 
alleviating the so-called “Delaney paradox” for carcinogenic pesticides.  That effort is largely tangential to the 
problem of farmworker exposure, and is abundantly detailed in other literature.  See, e.g., Scott Douglas Bauer, 
Note, The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996: Replacing Old Impracticalities with New Uncertainties in Pesticide 
Regulation, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1369, 1373–87 (1997); James Smart, All the Stars in the Heavens Were in the Right 
Places: The Passage of the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 273 (1998). i.  Registration and Labeling 
Under FIFRA, EPA has sole authority to approve pesticides for use in the U.S., through a 
process of registration and periodic review.
61  As part of the registration process, EPA must 
determine that the pesticide’s use “will not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the 
environment,”
62 and that the proposed labeling of the pesticide meets statutory and regulatory 
requirements.
63  FIFRA defines “unreasonable adverse effect” to mean both human dietary risk 
and “any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, 
and environmental costs and benefits” of the pesticide.
64  Consequently, “[p]esticides are sold 
and distributed only if EPA determines that the benefits outweigh the risks.”
65  The legislative 
history of FIFRA indicates that this balancing must encompass “every relevant factor that [EPA] 
can conceive of.”
66  The approved labeling for a registered pesticide often reflects the results of 
this assessment, through use restrictions or required mitigation measures designed to reduce 
adverse effects.
67 
EPA’s responsibilities do not end once a pesticide is registered.  First, under a 1988 
amendment to FIFRA, EPA was required to reregister all pesticide active ingredients approved 
for sale prior to 1984,
68 to ensure pesticides that do not “meet today’s scientific and regulatory 
standards” do not remain on the market.
69  EPA completed the reregistration process in 2008, 
ultimately canceling over a third of the relevant pesticides, and the Reregistration Eligibility 
                                                 
61 See 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2006). 
62 Id. § 136a(c)(5). 
63 See id. § 136a(c)(5)(B), (c)(9).  Improperly labeled pesticides are considered misbranded.  See id. § 136(q). 
64 Id. § 136(bb). 
65 EPA, Draft PR Notice 2009-X: Additional Information and Questions for Commenters 4 (2009), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov (Docket No. EPA-HQ-OPP-2009-0628). 
66 S. REP. NO. 92-838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 4032. 
67 Id. 
68 See 7 U.S.C. § 136a-1. 
69 See EPA, Pesticide Reregistration Facts, http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/reregistration/reregistration_facts.htm 
(last visited May 8, 2010). Determinations (REDs) for reregistered active ingredients often include measures to reduce risks, 
which must be reflected on the labeling of end-use products containing those active ingredients.
70  
Second, in 1996 the FQPA established a “registration review” program that requires EPA to 
review each pesticide registration by 2022 and then every fifteen years thereafter.
71  This 
program is intended to replace one-time-only reregistrations with an ongoing review process that 
can take account of evolving knowledge about pesticide risks and benefits.
72 
ii.  Tolerances 
Under the FFDCA, EPA establishes “tolerances” for pesticide residues in food.  
Tolerances are allowable quantities of pesticide residues, determined to be “safe” by EPA, which 
may remain on or in foods without rendering the food adulterated under the Act.
73  Prior to the 
FQPA, tolerances were determined for each pesticide individually, and only by reference to their 
use on food crops.
74  This approach both ignored the interactive health effects of different 
pesticide exposures with similar effects on the body, and ignored any exposures that did not 
come through food consumption.  As a result, many pesticide risks to the general population — 
and many of the unique risks to farmworker families in particular — were simply not considered. 
The 1996 FQPA made several dramatic changes to the tolerance-setting process, 
triggered in part by the publication of a major National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report 
                                                 
70 Id.  
71 See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(g)(1)(A)(iii)–(iv). 
72 The registration review program got underway only a few years ago and EPA plans to open review on 
approximately 70 registrations per year through 2017.  The agency plans to generally review older pesticides first, 
but will also group related pesticides during the process.  See generally EPA, Registration Review: Program 
Highlights, http://www.epa.gov/oppsrrd1/registration_review/highlights.htm (last visited May 8, 2010) (discussing 
the program and timetable). 
73 See 21 U.S.C. § 346a (2006). 
74 See What is a Risk Cup, Anyway? FQPA’s Pivotal Concept, FARM CHEMICALS, May 1998, available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3842/is_199805/ai_n8805425. arguing for significant reform to pesticide regulation to protect infants and children.
75  First, as 
an accompaniment to the reregistration process described above, the FQPA required EPA to 
reassess the safety of all tolerances established prior to 1996 by 2006.
76  This required EPA to 
reassess a total of 9,721 tolerances, a task EPA largely completed on schedule.
77   
In addition, as recommended in the NAS report,
78 the FQPA mandated a comprehensive 
“risk cup” approach to safety evaluation, so-called because it sets a maximum safe exposure 
level from multiple sources of a particular pesticide-based harm; the tolerance level for a 
pesticide residue must be low enough to ensure that the residue exposure will not cause the “cup” 
to “overflow.”  The FQPA defines “safe” as “a reasonable certainty that no harm will result from 
aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue, including all anticipated dietary exposures 
and all other exposures for which there is reliable information.”
79  Residues not meeting this new 
standard for safety are considered an “unreasonable adverse effect” under FIFRA; consequently, 
EPA cannot register a pesticide unless total exposure is reasonably certain not to cause harm.
80 
The “risk cup” approach requires EPA to consider “available information” about 
numerous factors in setting, adjusting, or revoking tolerances.
81  Two types of considerations 
deserve special mention.  First, EPA must consider both aggregate and cumulative exposures.  
                                                 
75 See NAS REPORT, supra note 47, at 7–12 (providing recommendations).  
76 See 7 U.S.C. § 136a-1(g)(2)(E); 21 U.S.C. § 346a(q). 
77 See EPA, Tolerance Reassessment, http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/tolerance/reassessment.htm (last visited May 8, 
2010).  Only 84 tolerances were incomplete at the end of the ten-year window, and those were completed by 
September 2007.  Id. 
78 See NAS REPORT, supra note 47, at 11 (“All exposures to pesticides — dietary and nondietary — need to be 
considered when evaluating the potential risks to infants and children.”)  The FQPA does not limit this revised risk 
assessment to children, however.  
79 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). 
80 See 7 U.S.C. § 136bb (defining “unreasonable adverse effect” to include “a human dietary risk from residues that 
result from a use of a pesticide in or on any food inconsistent with the standard under [21 U.S.C. § 346a]”); see also 
OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, EPA, GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR PERFORMING AGGREGATE EXPOSURE AND RISK 
ASSESSMENTS 9 (2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppfead1/trac/science/aggregate.pdf [hereinafter OPP, 
RISK ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES] (“[T]he standard for making decisions whether to register or continue registration of 
a pesticide for food-use must satisfy the standards in the FFDCA.”). 
81 See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a)(2)(D).   Aggregate exposure refers to the “combined exposures to a single chemical across multiple 
routes (oral, dermal, inhalation) and across multiple pathways (food, drinking water, 
residential)”
82 and cumulative exposure refers to exposure effects from all pesticides with a 
“common mechanism of toxicity,” meaning comparable health effects.
83  Second, EPA must 
consider the particular susceptibilities of “major identifiable subgroups of consumers” due to 
different sensitivities, aggregate exposure levels, and consumption patterns.
84   
  Finally, the FQPA included a special provision to protect infants and children.  The NAS 
report found that “the toxicity of pesticides is frequently different in children and adults,” but 
that “quantitative differences in toxicity between children and adults are usually less than a factor 
of approximately 10-fold.”
85  The NAS report recommended “a presumption of greater toxicity 
to infants and children” through an “uncertainty factor” to be applied in setting tolerances “when 
there is evidence of postnatal developmental toxicity and when data from toxicity testing relative 
to children are incomplete.”
86  In other words, absent data to the contrary, EPA should presume 
that children are more susceptible to a pesticide chemical and adjust the tolerance accordingly, 
by capping residues at a level lower than would be required to protect adults. 
  The FQPA did exactly that.  It required EPA, in making tolerance decisions, to 
specifically consider risks based on the consumption patterns, special susceptibilities, and 
cumulative exposures of infants and children.
87  And in determining if a tolerance was safe for 
children, it required EPA to apply “an additional tenfold margin of safety for the pesticide 
chemical residue and other sources of exposure . . . to take into account potential pre- and post-
                                                 
82 OPP, RISK ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES, supra note 80, at 8; see also 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a)(2)(D)(vi). 
83 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a)(2)(D)(v). 
84 Id. § 346a(a)(2)(D)(iv), (vi), (vii). 
85 NAS REPORT, supra note 47, at 3. 
86 Id. at 8. 
87 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a)(2)(C)(i). natal toxicity.”
88  EPA could apply a different margin of safety only if “reliable data” 
demonstrated a different margin would be safe.
89  Consequently, once EPA calculates a tolerance 
level that is “safe” for the average adult, it must promulgate a formal tolerance that is ten times 
lower than that, or else use a factor (greater or less than the “10x factor”) that is scientifically 
supportable.
90 
  To summarize, FIFRA, the FFDCA, and the FQPA delineate a framework for EPA 
decision making, both in approving pesticides for use and in establishing permissible levels of 
exposure.  Pesticides can be approved only if their overall benefits outweigh their costs, taking 
into account all relevant factors.  And pesticide residues can remain on food only at levels that 
will be safe — even for more-susceptible children — taking into account numerous sources of 
exposure. These conditions suggest that EPA has the statutory capacity, and perhaps even the 
duty, to account for the unique exposure risks farmworker families face. 
b.  Executive Orders on Environmental Justice and Children’s Health    
In addition to EPA’s particular duties under the statutes described above, the agency also 
must comply with executive orders applicable to all agencies.  In the context of farmworker 
pesticide exposure, two executive orders issued by President Clinton, pertaining to 
environmental justice and children’s health, are particularly relevant.  The orders provide further 
evidence of EPA’s legal duties to farmworkers, as a context for evaluating EPA’s actions to date. 
                                                 
88 Id. § 346a(a)(2)(C)(ii). 
89 Id. 
90 Despite the presumption, EPA’s Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) stated in 2002 that “[g]iven the extensive 
amount of data available, . . . in most instances there will be sufficient reliable data to conduct an individualized 
assessment of what additional FQPA safety factor is necessary.”  OFC. OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, EPA, 
DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE FQPA SAFETY FACTOR(S) IN TOLERANCE ASSESSMENT 13 (2002) [hereinafter 
OPP, SAFETY FACTOR POLICY]; see also Imidacloprid – Order Denying Objections to Issuance of Tolerance, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 30,042, 30,056–66 (May 26, 2004) (explaining use of a 3x safety factor instead). In 1994 President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898, “Federal Actions to Address 
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations.”
91  The order 
required federal agencies to “make achieving environmental justice part of [their] mission by 
identifying and addressing . . . disproportionately high and adverse human health or 
environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-
income populations.”
92  Each agency must develop “an agency-wide environmental justice 
strategy” to revise agency programs to among other things, “promote enforcement of all health 
and environmental statutes” in minority and low-income communities, and “improve research 
and data collection” about minority and low-income populations.
93  Particularly relevant to 
farmworkers is the requirement that, “whenever practicable and appropriate,” environmental and 
human health research “include diverse segments of the population . . . , including segments at 
high risk from environmental hazards, such as . . . workers who may be exposed to substantial 
environmental hazards.”
94  This requirement seems applicable to EPA research efforts 
underlying cost-benefit analyses and tolerance assessments for pesticides. 
EPA has embraced the environmental justice mandate to a considerable degree.
95  The 
agency established an Office of Environmental Justice in 1992,
96 and EPA’s 1995 Environmental 
Justice Strategy, developed pursuant to the executive order, stated an early commitment to 
ensuring that “[n]o segment of the population . . . , as a result of EPA’s policies, programs, and 
                                                 
91 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
92 Id. § 1-101, at 7629. 
93 Id. § 1-103(a), at 7630. 
94 Id. § 3-301(a), at 7631. 
95 See generally EPA, Environmental Justice, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/ (last visited May 8, 2010) 
(detailing EPA efforts). 
96 See EPA, Environmental Justice: Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/faqs/index.html (last visited May 8, 2010).  The office was originally 
called the Office of Environmental Equity; its name was changed in 1994. activities, suffers disproportionately from adverse human health and environmental effects.”
97  
While in 2004 EPA’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued a report critiquing EPA’s 
environmental justice efforts,
98 since that time EPA has taken additional steps to address 
environmental justice.  One significant development is the annual promulgation of environmental 
justice “action plans” from each EPA headquarters office and each regional office.  EPA’s Office 
of Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances (OPPTS) has included pesticide-related 
environmental justice initiatives in several recent action plans.
99 
In 1997 President Clinton issued Executive Order 13,045, “Protection of Children from 
Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks.”
100  Noting the scientific agreement that “children 
may suffer disproportionately from environmental health risks and safety risks,” the order 
required agencies to prioritize identification of disproportionate environmental health and safety 
risks to children, and “ensure that . . . policies, programs, activities, and standards address” such 
risks.
101  The order also required that when agencies submit major agency actions to the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) for pre-promulgation cost-benefit review, the agency include 
                                                 
97 EPA, THE EPA’S ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRATEGY 3 (1995), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/policy/ej_strategy_1995.pdf. 
98 OFC. OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, EPA, REPORT NO. 2004-P-00007, EVALUATION REPORT: EPA NEEDS TO 
CONSISTENTLY IMPLEMENT THE INTENT OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ON ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (2004).  The OIG 
report noted that “EPA has not . . . consistently integrated environmental justice into its day-to-day operations,” id. 
at i, and in particular objected to EPA’s failure to adhere to the order’s specific focus on minority and low-income 
populations, instead focusing on “environmental justice for everyone,” id. at ii.  However, EPA objected strenuously 
to OIG’s characterization of the order.  See Memorandum from Stephen L. Johnson, Administrator, to Nikki 
Tinsley, Inspector General, Agency Response to Recommendations Provided in the OIG Evaluative Report (June 7, 
2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/policy/oig-report-ej-cover-memo-response-6-8-
04.pdf. 
99 For example, the 2009 action plan selected as a key “focus area” incorporation of environmental justice into 
pesticide risk assessments.  See OFC. OF PREVENTION, PESTICIDES, AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES, ACTION PLAN TO 
INTEGRATE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 3–4 (2009).  And the 2007–2008 plan highlighted efforts to improve pesticide 
safety training and hazard communication for farmworkers, as well as new risk mitigation measures for soil 
fumigants to protect workers and their children.  See OFC. OF PREVENTION, PESTICIDES, AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES, 
ACTION PLAN TO INTEGRATE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 11, 12, 20 (2008). 
100 Exec. Order No. 13,045, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,885 (Apr. 21, 1997).  
101 Id. § 1-101, at 19,885.  “an evaluation of the environmental health and safety effects of the planned regulation on 
children.”
102 
EPA has responded to the executive order on children’s health, coupled with the 
children’s health mandates of the FQPA, in a number of ways.  In May 1997, shortly after the 
order issued, EPA established the Office of Children’s Health Protection (OCHP).
103  Even prior 
to the order, EPA had created a seven-step “National Agenda to Protect Children’s Health from 
Environmental Threats”
104 and developed a children’s health policy explicitly requiring EPA to 
“consider the risks to infants and children consistently and explicitly as a part of risk 
assessments.”
105  EPA’s Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) has also taken numerous actions 
with respect to children’s health and pesticides, which are discussed in greater detail below.
106  
As with environmental justice efforts, OPP’s efforts to protect children have been critiqued by 
the OIG,
107 but several new efforts indicate ongoing attention to the issue.   
The executive orders on environmental justice and children’s health are an important 
complement to the statutory framework of FIFRA, the FFDCA, and the FQPA.  While the 
statutes give EPA the authority to address risks to farmworkers and their families, the executive 
orders give EPA the duty to do so.  The farmworker demographics clearly indicate that 
                                                 
102 Id. § 5-501, at 19,887. 
103 See EPA, Children’s Health: Our History, http://yosemite.epa.gov/ochp/ochpweb.nsf/content/whowe_history.htm 
(last visited May 8, 2010). 
104 See id.  
105 See EPA, Policy on Evaluating Health Risks to Children (effective Nov. 1, 1995), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/osa/spc/pdfs/memohlth.pdf.  In 2006, EPA produced a detailed guide for agency staff on how to 
comply with the children’s health policy and the executive order.  See EPA, GUIDE TO CONSIDERING CHILDREN’S 
HEALTH WHEN DEVELOPING EPA ACTIONS (2006), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ochp/ochpweb.nsf/content/ADPguide.htm/$File/EPA_ADP_Guide_508.pdf 
106 See infra Part IV.b.  Some current efforts are detailed on EPA’s Children’s Health website.  See EPA, Children’s 
Health: Regulations — Pesticides, http://yosemite.epa.gov/ochp/ochpweb.nsf/content/regs.htm#6 (last visited May 
8, 2010). 
107 See OFC. OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, EPA, REPORT NO. 2006-P-00028, EVALUATION REPORT: MEASURING THE 
IMPACT OF THE FOOD QUALITY PROTECTION ACT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (2006).  The OIG found OPP 
“primarily measured its success and the impact of FQPA by adherence to its reregistration schedule rather than by 
improvements in children’s health,” and advocated a shift in priorities from “outputs” to “outcomes.”  Id. at 4. farmworker communities are both minority and low-income communities, and environmental 
justice efforts should address the unique risks that they face.  And farmworker children are 
particularly appropriate targets of children’s health efforts, since they experience not only 
common pathways of pesticide exposure but also additional exposures as a result of their 
parents’ occupations and their often close proximity to pesticide-treated fields.  EPA certainly 
has not ignored its duties to protect children and at-risk communities, but as the next section will 
demonstrate, these efforts have often overlooked the special concerns of farmworker families. 
IV.  Past EPA Efforts: The Farmworker Family Gap 
While this paper focuses on past EPA efforts to improve protections for farmworkers and 
their families, EPA activities in this general area are not a new development.  In fact, as this 
section will demonstrate, EPA has a long history of regulatory efforts to protect farmworkers 
from pesticides.  And particularly since the passage of the FQPA, the agency has taken numerous 
actions to protect children from pesticides.  As discussed below, and as can be expected from any 
regulatory program, each of these efforts has some weaknesses in terms of focus or effectiveness.  
But there is a more glaring and systematic defect in EPA’s past efforts: none of them have 
adequately addressed the unique risks facing farmworker families.  In effect, EPA has failed to 
combine its twin focuses on farmworkers and children, producing a regulatory gap where these 
areas overlap and leaving farmworker families unjustifiably unprotected. 
a.  The Worker Protection Standard 
One of EPA’s earliest and most persistent efforts to address pesticide risks to 
farmworkers is the Worker Protection Standard (WPS), a set of regulations designed to protect 
farmworkers from harmful effects associated with direct and indirect use and handling of pesticides.
108  The first WPS was promulgated in 1974.
109  It prohibited applying pesticides in the 
vicinity of unprotected workers, and required that farmworkers be given warnings when 
pesticides were to be applied.
110  It also established “reentry intervals,” barring unprotected 
workers from entering treated fields “until sprays have dried or dusts have settled.”
111  Its 
application was limited to farmworkers performing hand labor in fields and thus did not include 
activities such as mixing or loading pesticides or operating pesticide-application equipment — 
obviously some of the most exposure-prone jobs — as well as non-field work in greenhouses or 
forestry.
112 
A major overhaul in 1992 dramatically expanded the scope of the WPS and added new 
protective requirements.
113  The WPS now covers both pesticide “handlers” (such as those who 
mix, load, or apply pesticides, or deal with pesticide application equipment), and “workers” at 
forests, greenhouses, and nurseries as well as farms.  Its goals are threefold: to reduce exposures, 
to mitigate exposures that do occur, and to provide workers with information and training.
114  To 
accomplish these goals, the WPS provides three tiers of protections.  First, both handlers and 
workers must receive their respective EPA-approved pesticide safety training and must have 
                                                 
108 40 C.F.R. pt. 170 (2010).  Amendments in 1972 to FIFRA gave the agency authority to establish such regulations 
by creating an enforceable requirement that pesticides be used in accordance with their labeling, see 7 U.S.C. § 
136j(a)(2)(G) (2006), and requiring that labeling contain “directions for use . . . adequate to protect health and the 
environment,” id. § 136(q)(1)(F).  This broad language has been interpreted to give EPA authority to impose 
regulations protecting farmworkers, based largely on legislative history.  See Organized Migrants in Community 
Action, Inc. v. Brennan, 520 F.2d 1161, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“[I]t is absolutely clear that by enacting [the 1972 
amendments] Congress intended to vest EPA with authority over farmworker exposure to pesticides.”); Final Rule: 
Worker Protection Standard, 57 Fed. Reg. 38,102, 38,102 (Aug. 21, 1992) (“The legislative history of the 1972 
amendments indicates an express intent of Congress that farmers, farmworkers, and others be afforded such 
protection under FIFRA.”) 
109 Worker Protection Standards: Restatement of Certain Existing Standards, 39 Fed. Reg. 16,888 (May 10, 1974). 
110 Id. at 16,889–90. 
111 Id. at 16,889.  The reentry interval was extended for twelve highly toxic pesticides.  Id.  Workers could enter the 
field during the reentry period if they wore “protective clothing,” defined as a head covering, long-sleeved shirt and 
pants, socks, and shoes.  Id. at 16,990. 
112 See Final Rule: Worker Protection Standard, 57 Fed. Reg. 38,102, 38,103 (Aug. 21, 1992). 
113 The overhaul was based in part on ongoing reports of worker poisonings, delays in the reregistration process, and 
increased use of acutely toxic pesticides (organophosphates and carbamates).  See id. 
114 See id. at 38,104. access to decontamination supplies, pesticide safety information, and “emergency assistance” 
(including transportation and details about their exposure).  Second, workers cannot enter treated 
areas during pesticide applications or subsequent “restricted entry intervals” (REIs), and they 
must be warned prior to applications.  Third, handlers must be provided with personal protective 
equipment (PPE) and specific instructions on the pesticide they are applying, and they cannot 
apply pesticides so as to contact any person other than another handler wearing PPE.
115 
The WPS seems to have the potential to provide strong protections to farmworkers, and 
perhaps even to farmworker families.  Most significant is the “no-contact” provision, requiring 
pesticide handlers and their employers to ensure “that no pesticide is applied so as to contact, 
either directly or through drift, any worker or other person” besides another handler.
116  If read 
literally, this provision could be understood to protect not only farmworkers from exposure on 
the job, but to protect farmworkers and their families in their homes and communities as well.  
For example, this provision could require on-site bathing or laundry drop-off before workers 
leave the farm, helping to prevent “track-in” when workers bring pesticides back to their homes 
on their skin, clothes, and shoes.  It could similarly require no spraying of pesticides upwind of 
agricultural communities or close to schools, parks, and other areas where farmworkers and their 
families gather.  And it could prohibit application of pesticides in a manner, or under conditions, 
which could lead to a reasonable risk of contact (such as aerial application on a windy day). 
Despite the promise of the WPS, it has proven to be ineffective not only in protecting 
farmworker families but in protecting the farmworkers themselves.  On a practical level, the 
WPS program is hampered by inadequate funding and enforcement.  Through FIFRA’s 
                                                 
115 See EPA, WPS QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 8.  Certain highly toxic pesticides and fumigants also 
require handlers to maintain voice or visual contact during the application process.  Id. 
116 40 C.F.R. § 170.210(a) (2010) (emphasis added) requirement of state primacy in enforcement of pesticide use violations, and opportunity for 
state-federal cooperative enforcement, virtually all states are responsible for enforcement of the 
WPS, rather than EPA.
117  State inspections of agricultural sites are overseen by the EPA 
regional office in the area, but these offices have widely differing levels of oversight and lack a 
uniform understanding about how many inspections are necessary per year or even what 
constitutes an inspection in the first place.
118    EPA provides states with funding for pesticide 
enforcement activities, to the tune of $20 million in 1999, but only $2 million is “specifically 
allocated for worker protection enforcement.”
119  With a mere $40,000 per state per year, it is 
hardly surprising that so few inspections are done.   
With so few inspections, it may be difficult to determine if employers are complying with 
the WPS.  But states that do have fairly robust inspection programs still experience widespread 
violations and poisoning incidents.  For example, data collected between 1998 and 2001 by the 
California Department of Pesticide Regulation (DPR) found numerous violations of the WPS in 
that state.  At substantial percentages of inspected sites, proper protective gear was not being 
used (42%), treated fields did not have posted warnings (35%), and basic decontamination 
supplies (soap, water, and towels) were not available (30%).
120  In the majority of sites, pesticide 
application records were not accessible to workers (77%) and pesticide safety leaflets were not 
displayed (53%).
121  And among forty-seven reported illnesses due to REI violations in the 
                                                 
117 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136u, 136w-1 (2006).  Forty-nine states are now authorized to cooperate with EPA in 
monitoring, enforcement, training, education, and cost-sharing through a grant program.  See EPA, FIFRA State and 
Tribal Assistance Grant Program, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/state/grants/fifra.html (May 8, 2010). 
118 See GAO, PESTICIDES, supra note 16, at 20–22.  The GAO found that some states conducted no inspections at all 
in 1998, id. at 21, and some states counted asking “a single question about worker protection” to be an inspection, 
id. at 22.  Some EPA regional offices never conducted joint inspections with state officials.  See id.  
119 Id. at 20; see also EPA, FIFRA State and Tribal Assistance Grant Program, supra note 117 (noting $19.2 million 
disbursed for enforcement, with additional funds available for certification and training). 
120 See FIELDS OF POISON, supra note 29, at 18 tbl.4.1.  
121 See id. at 18 tbl.4.2. previous decade, only five were due to a worker ignoring a notice; in all other cases, employers 
either failed to provide required oral or written notices or else simply ordered workers to enter a 
field despite posted warnings.
122  This extensive noncompliance in California, historically a 
leader in inspection and enforcement, suggests that compliance might well be far worse in states 
where employers can count on little or no oversight. 
Even setting aside uneven enforcement and inadequate funding, there is reason to think 
that the WPS cannot adequately protect farmworker families.  First, even with complete 
compliance, poisonings may be unavoidable and even commonplace.  Again, data from 
California is instructive.  In the period from 1997 to 2000, the DPR found that nearly thirty-eight 
percent of the 1,899 reported poisonings were not due to violations of the WPS, suggesting 
substantial numbers of poisonings may result even with full compliance.
123  The figures were 
even higher for exposures due to drift and residue (42% and 56%, respectively, with no relevant 
violations), suggesting that WPS controls in these areas may be particularly inadequate.
124   
Second, the REIs established by EPA to date have been inadequate in several respects, 
despite the fact that EPA considers them “one of the most important protections provided” in the 
WPS.
125  REIs are set so that workers reenter the field at a time when typical farmworker tasks 
will no longer expose them to dangerous levels of airborne or residual pesticides.  These 
determinations rely in part on body weight, but EPA has long used a “default” of 154 pounds — 
                                                 
122 See id. at 24 tbl.5.1. 
123 See FIELDS OF POISON, supra note 29, at 19 tbl.4.3.  This included situations where no violations were found and 
situations where violations did not contribute to the poisoning.  Id. 
124 See id. at 19. 
125 GAO, PESTICIDES, supra note 16, at 5; see also Keith Cunningham-Parmenter, A Poisoned Field: Farmworkers, 
Pesticide Exposure, and Tort Recovery in an Era of Regulatory Failure, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 431, 
459–61 (2004) (detailing numerous failings of REIs and the WPS beyond those described herein). considered a typical adult male worker’s body weight — in most cases.
126  EPA has not utilized, 
or considered necessary, a lower body weight default that might better approximate the weight 
(and exposure risk) of children and adolescents present in the fields.
127  Furthermore, REIs 
currently do not account for either aggregate effects from exposure outside the fields, or 
cumulative effects of many pesticides with a common mechanism of toxicity.
128  In effect, this 
approach treats the farmworker’s “risk cup” as empty when determining REIs, an obviously false 
premise.  While the assumptions undergirding the WPS are changing,
129 for now the WPS has a 
dismaying record of failures and inadequacies, and the diffuse authority and substantial 
underfunding of the state enforcement programs only aggravate the problem. 
b.  The FQPA Risk Assessment Process 
While the process of setting REIs for workers fails to consider several variables 
important to a rigorous scientific assessment, we might hold out more hope for the FQPA’s 
tolerance-setting process.  After all, the FQPA mandated not only a comprehensive “risk cup” 
analysis of all possible pesticide exposures, but also imposed a safety factor designed to protect 
infants and children.  It seems clear that the FQPA’s purpose was to ensure pesticide residues on 
food would not endanger Americans, particularly children; has it delivered on that promise for 
farmworker children?  Sadly, as discussed below, the answer is clearly “no.”  And as the REI 
situation suggests, the FQPA’s benefits for tolerance-setting have not yet spread to other areas of 
EPA pesticide regulation. 
                                                 
126 See GAO, PESTICIDES, supra note 16, at 19; Cunningham-Parmenter, supra note 125, at 459.  EPA uses a lower 
body weight (132 pounds) for pesticides with “potential fetal developmental effects” to conform with the likely 
body weight of adult women. GAO, PESTICIDES, supra, at 19. 
127 Instead, EPA claims that adolescents (ages 12–17) will have similar exposure levels to adults despite smaller 
body weights, and that children (under age twelve) are not considered because they are not of legal age to work and 
thus the WPS is inapplicable to them.  See GAO, PESTICIDES, supra note 16, at 16, 19. 
128 See Cunningham-Parmenter, supra note 125, at 460. 
129 See Pesticide Registration (PR) Notice 2009-X Draft: Pesticide Drift Labeling (2009), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov (Docket No. EPA-HQ-OPP-2009-0628). i.  Considering Only Non-Occupational Exposures. 
First, there is a significant gap in the FQPA’s coverage that has prevented EPA from 
accurately assessing the true pesticide risks facing farmworker families.  While EPA assesses 
dietary and residential pesticide exposures in setting tolerances, it does not consider occupational 
exposures such as those experienced by farmworkers.  Recall that tolerances can only be set at 
levels that are “safe,” and the FQPA defines safety to mean “a reasonable certainty that no harm 
will result from . . . all anticipated dietary exposures and all other exposures.”
130  The definition 
seems to require that EPA must consider potential occupational exposures — both direct 
exposures to farmworkers at work, and consequent “trickle-down” effects of those occupational 
exposures, such as pesticide track-in and drift.   
Yet at the same time, in listing factors EPA should consider in tolerance decisions, the 
FQPA explicitly directs EPA to consider, “among other relevant factors,” information about 
“aggregate exposure levels . . . including . . . exposure from non-occupational sources.”
131  EPA 
has read this “non-occupational” language back into the safety definition as a limitation, stating 
repeatedly that the safety definition encompasses “exposure through drinking water and in 
residential settings, but does not include occupational exposure.”
132  As a result, in determining 
aggregate exposure, EPA considers only “exposures from the pesticide residues in food and all 
other non-occupational exposures, including drinking water . . . and exposure through pesticide 
use in gardens, lawns, or buildings (residential and other indoor uses).”
133  EPA does not 
consider occupational exposure to be part of aggregate exposure. 
                                                 
130 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii); see supra text accompanying notes 79–80. 
131 Id. § 346a(b)(2)(D)(vi) (emphasis added). 
132 Final Rule: Tolerance Exemption for Residues of Quaternary Ammonium Compounds, 72 Fed. Reg. 51,180, 
51,182 (Sept. 6, 2007). 
133 Id. at 51,183. In 2002, as part of a larger series of objections, the Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC) objected to EPA’s focus on non-occupational exposures.
134  NRDC argued that “worker 
exposure is clearly included” in the FQPA safety definition’s “catch-all category of ‘all other 
exposures’” and that the list of factors “is plainly illustrative rather than exhaustive” because it 
“explicitly requires EPA to consider ‘relevant factors’ other than those enumerated.”
135  NRDC 
essentially argued that these provisions could be harmonized by making non-occupational 
exposure only one factor among many “relevant,” but not all explicit, factors — including 
occupational exposure — to be considered by EPA in determining a “safe” tolerance.
136  NRDC 
claimed any interpretation that excluded occupational exposure “violates the FQPA’s mandate 
that aggregate exposure assessments include all exposures for which there is reliable 
information.”
137   
EPA rejected NRDC’s interpretation, stating the language in the statutory list of factors 
“quite plainly directs EPA to limit consideration of aggregate exposures . . . to those exposures 
arising from non-occupational sources.”
138  Although acknowledging “some ambiguity” in how 
the two statutory provisions interacted, EPA said NRDC’s interpretation “runs afoul of 
Congress’ explicit mandate that such exposures not be included” and contravenes basic statutory 
interpretation principles.
139  EPA harmonized the two provisions in a different way, finding that 
                                                 
134 See Objection to Tolerances Established for Certain Pesticide Chemicals, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,628, 41,630–34 (June 
19, 2002) (reprinting text of a representative NRDC petition). 
135 Id. at 41,633. NRDC also noted EPA had cited “no provision of the statute or any other authority to support its 
repeated incantation that aggregate exposure does not include occupational exposure.”  Id. 
136 While the FQPA directs EPA’s attention specifically to non-occupational exposures in § 346a(b)(2)(D)(vi), it 
never explicitly forbids EPA to consider occupational exposure, and tolerances must be safe based on all exposures 
under § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
137 67 Fed. Reg. at 41,633. 
138 Imidacloprid – Order Denying Objections to Issuance of Tolerance, 69 Fed. Reg. 30,042, 30,067 (May 26, 2004). 
139 Id. Congress had clearly stated (a) that occupational exposure was not part of aggregate exposure, 
and (b) that occupational exposure was not relevant to safety.
140 
However irrational such contentions might appear on their face, legislative history 
suggests that EPA has the better of this argument.  The Report of the House Committee on 
Commerce accompanying the FQPA states that, for tolerance setting: 
“[S]afe” means there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to 
the pesticide chemical residue. The Committee understands “aggregate exposure” to the pesticide 
chemical  residue  to  include  dietary  exposures  under  all  tolerances  for  the  pesticide  chemical 
residue, and exposure from other non-occupational sources as well.
141 
The most natural reading (though certainly not the only possible reading) of this congressional 
language is that safety encompasses only aggregate exposure, which in turn encompasses only 
non-occupational exposure.  Unfortunately, no legislative history explains Congress’s reason for 
denying EPA even discretionary authority to consider occupational exposures to farmworkers in 
determining “safe” tolerance levels.  But EPA’s proposed explanation in its response to NRDC is 
most likely correct: Congress’s concern in the FQPA was establishing “safe” pesticide levels for 
the average American consumer, not highly at-risk populations.
142   
As its name implies, the FQPA was concerned with risks from food, and its goal was to 
ensure that food consumption would not cause the consumer’s “risk cup” to overflow.  Its 
approach in tolerance setting is appropriate to achieving this goal for typical consumers who face 
no occupational exposure.  But for farmworkers and their families, it does not ensure safety.  
                                                 
140 Id. at 30,068 (“Congress, by excluding occupational exposures from the term ‘aggregate exposure’ . . . , was, in 
effect, determining the relevance of occupational exposure to aggregate exposure and the safety determination.”). 
141 H.R. Rep. No. 104-669, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., at 40 (July 23, 1996). 
142 See 69 Fed. Reg. at 30,068 (“Presumably, Congress excluded occupational exposures from [§ 346a] because it 
determined that acceptable levels in food for the general public should not b set using the discrete, and highly 
regulated (including regulation by EPA under FIFRA), exposures occurring in the workplace as an assumed 
underlying exposure.”). Like a crack in the risk cup, this statutory gap lets important occupational exposures trickle out 
of the analysis, allowing tolerances to be set that appear safe when occupational exposures are 
ignored, but in reality are potentially unsafe for both farmworkers and their families.   
While EPA’s approach is arguably the correct one, given legislative intent, it leaves a 
major gap in the FQPA’s protections.  The higher exposures of agricultural workers and, 
indirectly, their families, are simply not considered in determining how much pesticide residue it 
is safe for them to consume.  If this gap leads to unsafe levels of total exposure for farmworker 
families, EPA arguably is not meeting its environmental justice obligations.  But if the statutory 
scheme dictates such a gap, is there anything that EPA can do to alleviate this disparity without 
legislative action?  While EPA may have some recourse, thus far it has not exercised it. 
ii.  Lower Child Safety Factors Despite Inconclusive Data 
A second reason why the FQPA has not sufficiently delivered safety to farmworker 
children is that EPA has not fully utilized the FQPA’s “child safety factor” to protect this 
particular subpopulation of children, citing inadequate or inconclusive data.  Recall that the 
FQPA required EPA to apply a tenfold safety factor (the “10x factor”) to protect children absent 
“reliable data” supporting a different factor.
143  Although the FQPA establishes a default 10x 
safety factor, OPP quickly developed a policy describing when EPA would deviate from the 10x 
factor, and how “appropriate” safety factors would be determined.
144  In several respects, OPP’s 
policy seems to strongly encourage the development of lower safety factors for most pesticides.   
First, the policy discourages reliance on the default 10x factor and states that “in most 
cases there will be sufficient reliable data to conduct an individualized assessment.”
145  Second, 
                                                 
143 See supra text accompanying notes 85–90. 
144 See OPP, SAFETY FACTOR POLICY, supra note 90.  The policy was first drafted in 1999.  See id. at 5. 
145 Id. at 13. the policy suggests no additional safety factor (i.e., a 1x safety factor) will be required in many 
cases — namely, when data “does not indicate a high level of concern for pre- and postnatal 
toxicity,”
146 or when the intraspecies safety factor, which predated the FQPA, is sufficient “to 
address the potential for greater sensitivity or susceptibility of children.”
147  This approach 
arguably turns the FQPA’s 10x factor on its head by making it the exception rather than the 
rule.
148  Third, the policy stressed that even if data indicated children were more sensitive or 
susceptible, “the risk assessor should not assume that there is a high level of concern.”
149   
In essence, OPP’s policy emphasizes that sensitivity does not translate automatically into 
risk, and that risk does not necessarily justify any additional safety factor for children at all.  
These are conservative assumptions, and perhaps accurate ones – but one would think that, given 
the FQPA’s child-protection mandate, OPP would develop conservative assumptions that favor 
child protection.  Instead, these assumptions have the potential to favor less protective outcomes 
that decrease the child safety factor.  In any case, regardless of any theoretical argument against 
the OPP policy, the practical reality has been that EPA has often established child safety factors 
for pesticides that are below the 10x default, even in the absence of complete toxicity and 
exposure data.
150   
                                                 
146 Id. at 30.  The same is true when the data indicate no concern.  In such cases, the presumption in favor of the 10x 
factor is “obviated.”  See id. at 29.  Consequently, instead of eliminating the 10x factor only when data indicates no 
concern, the OPP policy eliminates the factor whenever there is anything other than high concern. 
147 Id. at 29.  The intraspecies factor, utilized long before the FQPA, is a 10x factor designed to account for 
variability among humans.  OPP stated that “for most chemicals the very large majority of people, including 
children, respond sufficiently similarly” that risk assessors could simply rely on the intraspecies factor alone.  Id. 
148 This is so because the consequences of OPP’s policy suggest the 10x factor — or indeed any factor at all — will 
only be necessary in a very few cases.  See supra notes 147–148.  This is particularly true in the case of the 
intraspecies factor, since OPP admits Congress intended the 10x factor to be additional to that factor, id. at A-3, but 
also states that in most cases the intraspecies factor will suffice on its own, id. at 29. 
149 Id. at 30; see also 69 Fed. Reg. at 30,057 (noting that “the focus should not be simply on whether the young have 
a greater sensitivity to a pesticide but rather on what reliable data show with regard to the safety of infants and 
children in situation where studies have shown that the young are more sensitive to a pesticide” (emphasis added)). 
150 See, e.g., 69 Fed. Reg. at 30,056–66. EPA’s preference for lower child safety factors is particularly concerning with regard to 
farmworker children, because, as noted above, farmworker families face unique routes of 
exposure that EPA often does not consider in determining exposure levels, including airborne 
drift and volatilization, track-in, and working or playing in treated fields.  These routes of 
exposure might justify higher safety factors; at the least, the lack of consideration of these 
exposure routes calls for a precautionary approach in setting the safety factor.  But instead of 
opting for the default 10x standard when there is reason to believe farmworker children may be 
at risk, EPA has frequently set a safety factor that, while protective of most children, may not be 
sufficient to protect farmworker children. 
NRDC’s 2002 petition to EPA regarding tolerances for five pesticides highlights this 
problem.  NRDC noted that “none of the regulations establishing tolerances for these five 
pesticides consider exposure through air drift, migration of contaminated soil, or residential take-
home exposures,” and submitted studies demonstrating the potential for farmworker children to 
experience such exposures.
151  EPA vigorously disputed the validity of the submitted studies, and 
cited several other studies with opposite or inconclusive results.
152  Ultimately, the agency 
concluded that “the data submitted by NRDC have not shown that there are significant exposures 
to farm children that occur as a result of living in close proximity to agricultural operations,” and 
thus EPA had “sufficient reliable data to find that an additional 10X factor is not needed.”
153  
Instead, EPA used lower safety factors for these five pesticides, and set tolerances based only on 
dietary, drinking water, and residential use.  The resulting tolerances were, in some cases, 
                                                 
151 67 Fed. Reg. at 41,633. 
152 See 69 Fed. Reg. at 30,050–54. 
153 Id. at 30,058. disturbingly close to projected exposure levels.  Any additional exposure to any child, including 
a farmworker’s child, might be unsafe.
154 
The safety factor determination for one pesticide in the petition – imidacloprid – nicely 
illustrates the consequences of combining low safety factors, detailed here, with analysis of only 
limited exposure routes, detailed in Part IV.b.i.  For imidacloprid, EPA used a safety factor of 3x 
and determined a “safe” margin of exposure (MOE) of 300 for children ages one to six; any 
exposure level lower than 300 would be unsafe.
155  EPA then determined that the MOE for this 
age group, based on the tolerance it had established for imidacloprid.  It determined that the 
MOE from chronic dietary exposure and hand-to-mouth exposure to turf, gardens, and pets was 
302 — just barely above the safe MOE.
156  If EPA had used the default 10x factor, the “safe” 
MOE would have been 1000 and the tolerance EPA had chosen would have been unsafe (which 
might explain why a 3x factor, not a 10x factor, was used).  But even if a 3x safety factor is 
appropriate, if farmworker children experienced any additional routes of exposure beyond those 
assessed by EPA, the expected MOE could easily dip below 300, making the tolerance EPA had 
selected unsafe.
157  In other words, EPA’s chosen tolerance level is only safe for farmworker 
children if they experience virtually no additional exposure to imidacloprid beyond that 
calculated for “ordinary” children based on “ordinary” exposure sources.
158 
                                                 
154 See 67 Fed. Reg. at 41,631–32.  
155 See Imidacloprid: Pesticide Tolerances for Emergency Exemptions, 64 Fed. Reg. 39,041, 39,047 (July 21, 1999).  
The MOE is a ratio, using as a numerator the level at which no adverse effect was observed (the NOAEL) in a 
toxicology study, and as a denominator the anticipated exposure level.  Thus, lower MOEs indicate more risk, since 
the NOAEL approaches the actual exposure level.  See OPP, RISK ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES, supra note 80, at 51.  
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156 Id.  
157 See 67 Fed. Reg. at 41,632. 
158 Another example is zeta-cypermethrin, where EPA used a no safety factor at all. See Zeta-Cypermethrin and Its 
Inactive R-isomers: Pesticide Tolerance, 67 Fed. Reg. 6422, 6426 (Feb. 12, 2002).  This led to a “safe” MOE of 100, 
when a 10x safety factor would have produced a safe MOE of 1000.  With a selected tolerance based only on 
dietary, drinking water, and residential exposure, EPA calculated numerous actual MOEs for children and infants Of course, EPA’s risk assessment process is complex, and perhaps its decisions about 
appropriate safety factors should not be second-guessed — though courts have done so.
159  But 
the fact that EPA does not consider at all the unique exposure routes of farmworker children at 
least raises the possibility that farmworker children are being inadequately protected by the 
safety factors EPA is using.  If exposure data for this subpopulation is inconclusive, one 
approach — the one EPA has chosen thus far — is to dismiss it entirely and decide children in 
agricultural areas do not face any increased exposure risk.  But another option — the more 
precautionary and protective option — would be to presume some increased exposure risk for 
agricultural areas, and use this uncertainty as a basis to retain, not discard, the FQPA’s default 
10x safety factor.   
iii.  Farmworker Children Not a Major Identifiable Subgroup  
In addition to the 10x safety factor, the FQPA also directed EPA to consider the special 
sensitivities of “major identifiable subgroups of consumers,” distinguished by different 
sensitivities, aggregate exposure levels, and consumption patterns.
160  Farmworkers, farmworker 
families, or farmworker children are all potentially major identifiable subgroups.  While it might 
be true that these children do not have unique sensitivities, they may have unique consumption 
patterns – due to their proximity to the fields, for example, they may be more likely to eat 
produce directly from the fields, and sooner after pesticide application than the average child.
161  
                                                 
ranging from 300 to 1000.  Id. at 6428.  With no safety factor, these values were considered safe, but they would all 
have been unsafe if a 10x factor had been utilized.   
159 See Nw. Coal. for Alternatives to Pesticides v. EPA, 544 F.3d 1043, 1051-53 (9th Cir. 2008) (remanding to EPA 
tolerance determinations for three pesticides where safety factor was reduced to 3x or 1x, because record disclosed 
no evidence that these reductions were supported by reliable data, and noting that “it appears that the EPA chose 
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160 See supra text accompanying note 84. 
161 See 67 Fed. Reg. at 41,632. And they arguably represent very different aggregate exposure levels, based on their unique 
routes of exposure.
162 
Thus far, EPA has declined to define any category of farmworker family members as a 
major identifiable subgroup.  NRDC’s 2002 petition to EPA stated that “farm children are a 
major identifiable subgroup under [the FQPA], and their unique dietary consumption patterns, 
aggregate exposure levels, and sensitivities to exposure should have been assessed” in setting the 
five pesticide tolerances at issue.
163  EPA rejected NRDC’s contention, on two grounds.  First, it 
claimed that such designation was unnecessary to protect farmworker children, because “[i]f a 
significant number of any of the population subgroups of children have higher exposures” that 
exposure would already be captured in the analysis for that population subgroup.  “The fact that 
the children in the subgroup receiving the higher exposures are not themselves labeled a major 
identifiable subgroup in no way lessens EPA’s consideration of their exposures.”
164  Second, it 
claimed that such designation was inappropriate since NRDC had not “made an adequate case 
that the group of children NRDC designates as ‘farm children’ are an identifiable group.”  EPA 
noted comments regarding the “heterogenous nature of the group and NRDC’s lack of precision 
in defining the group,” and also observed that NRDC’s proposed grouping was contrary to past 
EPA practice of “categorizing individuals by age, ethnicity, and region of the country.”
165  
Furthermore, EPA also noted some urban residents live just as close to agricultural areas as 
“farm children,” thus “cloud[ing] the potential for a distinction between farm and non-farm 
children.”
166 
                                                 
162 See supra text accompanying notes 50–52. 
163 67 Fed. Reg. at 41,632. 
164 69 Fed. Reg. at 30,068. 
165 Id. at 30,069. 
166 Id. V.  Conclusion: New Developments on the Horizon? 
As this paper has shown, EPA’s approval and safety evaluation process for pesticides 
leaves much to be desired in the area of farmworker protections.  Despite clear mandates in the 
FQPA and the executive orders on environmental justice and children’s health, EPA has failed to 
consider important pesticide exposure routes for farmworkers and their families, and has created 
inadequate protections for a socioeconomically disadvantaged group.  And EPA has resisted 
attempts of groups like NRDC to get EPA to meet its obligations and respond to the unique risks 
of farmworker families. 
Recently, EPA has proposed to make some changes to the current pesticide framework 
that may offer some increased protections to farmworker families.  First, in November 2009, 
EPA proposed to revise the labeling on pesticides prone to drift, in order to minimize the risk of 
pesticides drifting off treated fields and into nearby homes and communities.
167  And in 
December 2009, EPA proposed to revise the risk assessment process to integrate the FQPA’s 
approach in all risk assessments for all pesticides (not just food-use pesticides), by including a 
child-protective safety factor, using a “risk cup” approach, and reporting risks for particular 
subgroups, including teenage farmworkers and children brought to the fields during the 
workday.
168  Both of these proposals would be a significant step in the right direction, but it 
remains to be seen if they will go forward as planned; public comment periods for both proposed 
rules closed in the spring of 2010, and no final rules have yet been promulgated.  Even if these 
changes do go forward, however, more is needed.  Advocacy groups have already encouraged 
                                                 
167 See Pesticide Registration (PR) Notice 2009-X Draft, supra note 130. 
168 See Revised Risk Assessment for Workers, Children of Workers in Agricultural Fields and Pesticides with No 
Food Uses (2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov (Docket No. EPA-HQ-OPP-2009-0889); Worker Risk 
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169 and establishing 
compensation funds for affected workers.
170  Only EPA’s future actions will reveal whether it 
will continue to downplay the risks to farmworker families, or whether the agency will pursue 
protective measures that fulfill the requirements of social and environmental justice. 
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